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Abstract: This paper explores factors that either motivate or constrain 
national judges’ participation in the preliminary ruling procedure. By 
incorporating insights and evidence from American judicial politics lit-
erature and drawing from three models of judicial decision making: 
the attitudinal model, the team model, and the resource management 
model, it places the study of judicial behaviour with respect to the 
preliminary ruling procedure on more rigorous theoretical grounds. 
The paper is based on survey results conducted among 415 national 
judges from two new EU Member States: Slovenia and Croatia. In line 
with the theoretical predictions, the results show that the decision to 
make a referral to the CJEU is determined by several individual- and 
court-level factors. These are the position that a court occupies in a 
national judicial hierarchy, the judicial workload and availability of 
resources, and judges’ knowledge and experiences with respect to EU 
law and Article 267 TFEU proceedings. 
Keywords: CJEU, preliminary ruling procedure, judicial behaviour, 
team model.
1 Introduction
The relationship between the national courts and the CJEU governed 
by the preliminary ruling procedure has been, and will most likely contin-
ue to be, one of the most perplexing aspects of European integration. One 
of many reasons for this can be found in the heterarchical (rather than hi-
erarchical) setting in which the EU operates. The CJEU does not possess 
the power to reverse national courts’ rulings nor are there any sanctions 
the Court can impose on national courts or judges for their failure to refer 
legal questions or to implement its rulings.1 Likewise, the CJEU cannot 
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1 Although there are no direct sanctions that the CJEU can employ against national courts, 
sanctions for a failure to make a referral under Article 267 TFEU can be directed against 
EU Member States. Based on the Köbler doctrine, Member States are liable for damages 
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offer a monetary reward or promotion to national judges for their ‘good 
service’.2 The absence of any sanctions or external incentives from the 
CJEU or the EU makes the participation of national judges in the Union’s 
legal order completely voluntary. What then drives judicial participation 
in the process of the legal, political, social and economic integration of 
Europe?
For three decades already this question has inspired (and contin-
ues to inspire) a great deal of literature. A variety of factors have been 
put forth to explain why national judges refer legal questions to the 
Luxembourg Court. Legal scholars have relied on the persuasiveness 
argument, (arguing that national courts have been convinced by the 
CJEU with the legal arguments of the validity of EU law supremacy) or 
on the plain meaning of Article 267(3) TFEU (emphasising the courts’ 
obligation to refer).3 Political scientists, at least in their early work, saw 
the desire for power as the main driver of lower courts’ participation 
in the procedure.4 Later research drew empirical conclusions based on 
large-scale data collections. The most infl uential work in this fi eld has 
focused on the variations in referral rates across time, Member States,5 
caused to individuals in cases where a breach of EU law was caused by a court of fi nal 
instance. This, however, does not apply to breaches of EU law caused by the fi rst instance 
or the appellate courts. See Case C-224/01 Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich [2003] 
ECR I-10239. Another possibility is that the European Commission takes legal action (a so-
called infringement procedure) against an EU Member State before the CJEU. This occurred 
in 2017 when the CJEU issued a landmark judgment in Commission v France and found 
France in breach of Article 267(3) TFEU for the failure of the French last instance court 
Conseil d’Etat to make a referral to the CJEU. See Case C-416/17 Commission v France 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:811. Finally, a failure to refer a preliminary question in cases that require 
this can constitute a violation of a fair trial and can be used as a basis for a claim before the 
ECtHR. See ECtHR, Ullens de Schooten and Rezabek v Belgium, Applications nos 3989/07 
and 38353/07, Judgment of 20 September 2011. These sanctions, however, apply with 
respect to fi nal instance courts only and are rarely used in practice.  
2 This type of incentive does not exist in national legal systems either, and nor would na-
tional judges consider it desirable. Based on interviews with national judges, Glavina found 
that judges do not think that their national judicial system should reward them fi nancially 
for sending preliminary questions. See Monika Glavina, ‘Reluctance to Participate in the 
Preliminary Ruling Procedure as a Challenge to EU Law: A Case Study on Slovenia and Cro-
atia’ in Clara Rauchegger and Anna Wallerman (eds), The Eurosceptic Challenge: National 
Implementation and Interpretation of EU Law (Hart Publishing 2019) 208.
3 M Claes, The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution (Hart Publishing 
2006) 247.
4 JHH Weiler, ‘A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and Its Interlocutors’ 
(1994) 26 Comparative Political Studies 510; Karen J Alter, ‘Explaining National Court 
Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal 
Integration’ in Anne-Marie Slaughter (ed), The European Court and National Courts: Doctrine 
and Jurisprudence: Legal Change in Its Social Context (Hart Publishing 1998).
5 Jonathan Golub, ‘The Politics of Judicial Discretion: Rethinking the Interaction between 
National Courts and the European Court of Justice’ (1996) 19(2) West European Politics 
360; Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas L Brunell, ‘The European Court and the National Courts: 
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legal areas,6 and levels of judiciary hierarchy.7 While all these contribu-
tions are indispensable in understanding judicial politics, we are still far 
from capturing the full picture of the Europeanisation of national judi-
ciaries. There are several reasons why we must update.
Common to the research on Article 267 referral activity is the fo-
cus on the number of referrals submitted to the CJEU. Much less has 
been written on the situations that do not necessitate the interpretation 
of the Luxembourg Court. Several names, however, deserve mention. A 
handful of scholars have emphasised that European judicial politics lit-
erature has focused too narrowly on the minority of decisions referred 
to the CJEU. They have argued that the number of national decisions 
involving EU law is much larger than the number of questions referred 
to the CJEU.8 Furthermore, recent studies stress that preliminary ques-
tions are, in fact, a rare event in the day-to-day work of a national judge.9 
A Statistical Analysis of Preliminary References, 1961−95’ (1998) 5(1) Journal of European 
Public Policy 66; Clifford J Carrubba and Lacey Murrah, ‘Legal Integration and Use of the Pre-
liminary Ruling Process in the European Union’ (2005) 59(2) International Organization 399; 
Marlene Wind, Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, and Gabriel Pons Rotger, ‘The Uneven Legal Push 
for Europe Questioning Variation When National Courts Go to Europe’ (2009) 10(1) European 
Union Politics 63; Marlene Wind, ‘The Nordics, the EU and the Reluctance Towards Suprana-
tional Judicial Review’ (2010) 48(4) Journal of Common Market Studies 1039. 
6 Karen J Alter and Jeannette Vargas, ‘Explaining Variation in the Use of European Litiga-
tion Strategies: European Community Law and British Gender Equality Policy’ (2000) 33(4) 
Comparative Political Studies 452; Lisa Conant, ‘Europeanization and the Courts: Variable 
Patterns of Adaptation among National Judiciaries’ in Maria Green Cowles, James Capo-
raso, and Thomas Risse (eds), Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change 
(Cornell Studies in Political Economy, Cornell University Press 2001); Rachel A Cichowski, 
‘The European Court and Civil Society: Litigation, Mobilization and Governance’ Cambridge 
Core, March 2007; Elise Muir and Sarah Kolf, ‘Belgian Equality Bodies Reaching Out to 
the CJEU: EU Procedural Law as a Catalyst,’ in Elise Muir, C. Kilpatrick, and B. De Witte 
(eds), How EU Law Shapes Opportunities for Preliminary References on Fundamental Rights: 
Discrimination, Data Protection and Asylum (EUI Working Paper 2017).
7 Weiler (n 4); Karen J Alter, ‘Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court 
Jurisprudence: A Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration’ in Anne-Marie Slaugh-
ter (ed), The European Court and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change 
in Its Social Context (Hart Publishing 1998); Arthur Dyevre, Monika Glavina, and Angelina 
Atanasova, ‘Who Refers Most? Institutional Incentives and Judicial Participation in the Pre-
liminary Ruling System,’ (2019) 0 Journal of European Public Policy 1.
8 Lisa Conant, Justice Contained: Law and Politics in the European Union (Cornell University 
Press 2002); Gareth Davies, ‘Activism Relocated. The Self-Restraint of the European Court 
of Justice in Its National Context’ (2012) 19 Journal of European Public Policy 76; Damian 
Chalmers, ‘The Positioning of EU Judicial Politics within the United Kingdom’ (2000) 23 
West European Politics 169; R Daniel Kelemen and Tommaso Pavone, ‘Mapping European 
Law’ (2016) 23 Journal of European Public Policy 1118; Denise Carolin Hübner, ‘The ‘Na-
tional Decisions’ Database (Dec.Nat): Introducing a Database on National Courts’ Interac-
tions with European Law’ (2015) 17 European Union Politics 324.
9 Tommaso Pavone, ‘Revisiting Judicial Empowerment in the European Union: Limits of 
Empowerment, Logics of Resistance’ (2018) 6 Journal of Law and Courts 303, 312−313; 
Dyevre, Glavina and Atanasova (n 7) 10; Glavina (n 2) 192−193.
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In 2018, the CJEU received a total of 568 preliminary questions from 
across the EU. This fi gure, however, needs to be viewed in the light of 
millions of disputes that are adjudicated by several thousands of courts 
across all 28 EU Member States. The fi gure can be further illustrated as 
the proportion of referring courts across the EU in the period between 
2004 and 2016. Figure 1 shows that referrals are normally made by less 
than 20 per cent of domestic courts.10 
Figure 1. The proportion of referring courts across the EU, 2004-16
The proportion was calculated as a fraction of the number of referring courts 
and the number of courts in a Member State. Sources: CEPEJ, Reports on the 
European Judicial Systems, 2004-16; CJEU, Annual reports, Judicial Activity. 
10 These patterns hold across most Member States, with the exception of Malta, Luxem-
bourg and the Netherlands. In the case of Luxembourg and Malta, these percentages can 
be attributed to the low number of courts in the two countries. In 2016, Luxembourg had 
eight, while Malta had eleven courts in total. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, this 
activity of national courts can be attributed to, fi rst, the non-existence of the judicial review 
and monist legal tradition and, second, to the fact that national judges are very supportive 
for EU law and the CJEU. Tobias Nowak and others, National Judges as European Union 
Judges: Knowledge, Experiences and Attitudes of Lower Court Judges in Germany and the 
Netherlands (Eleven International Publishing 2011).
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In addition, the number of preliminary questions disguises the high 
number of ‘repeat players’. References often come from the same national 
court, or even from the same judge sitting on a specifi c court.11 Dyevre 
and others, for example, found that almost 52 per cent of Spanish refer-
rals can be attributed to the Tribunal Supremo. Furthermore, the three 
Dutch supreme courts − Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, College van Beroep 
and Raad van State − account for almost 55 per cent of Dutch refer-
ences.12 The same holds for Slovenian courts. More than two-thirds of 
Slovenian references (68 per cent) originate from the Slovenian Supreme 
Court. Furthermore, three out of eleven references submitted by Croa-
tian courts from 2013 to 2018 came from the same judge sitting at the 
Municipal Court of Velika Gorica. This supports the argument that the 
majority of national judges will never in their entire judicial career sub-
mit a preliminary question to the CJEU.13
Another feature of European judicial politics literature is its focus 
on country-level data. We know a great deal about the factors that cause 
cross-national variations in the number of referrals to the CJEU, yet 
very little has been written on the sub-national penetration of EU law 
at the court- and judge-level. Kelemen and Pavone tried to address this 
limitation by moving to the regional level. They demonstrated that there 
are few theoretical justifi cations and little empirical evidence to suggest 
that the referral rates are uniformly distributed within a country.14 Only 
recently have scholars started to study the motives of individual judges 
and how micro-level determinants such as the knowledge, preferences 
and experiences of judges shape the referral activity of national courts.15 
Finally, despite the well-documented research on the determinants 
of the referral activity of national courts and judges, European judicial 
11 Michal Bobek, ‘Talking Now? Preliminary Rulings in and from the New Member States’ 
(2014) 21 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 782, 785.
12 Dyevre, Glavina and Atanasova (n 7) 15.
13 Pavone (n 9); Dyevre, Glavina and Atanasova (n 7); Glavina (n 2).
14 Kelemen and Pavone (n 8) 1119.
15 Nowak and others (n 10); Juan A Mayoral Díaz-Asensio, ‘The Politics of Judging EU Law: 
A New Approach to National Courts in the Legal Integration of Europe’ (Thesis, European 
University Institute 2013); Juan A Mayoral Díaz-Asensio, ‘In the CJEU Judges Trust: A 
New Approach in the Judicial Construction of Europe’ (2017) 55 Journal of Common Mar-
ket Studies 551; Juan A Mayoral, Urszula Jaremba and Tobias Nowak, ‘Creating EU Law 
Judges, the Role of Generational Differences, Legal Education and Career Paths in National 
Judges’ Assessment Regarding EU Law Knowledge’ (2014) 8 Journal of European Public 
Policy; Urszula Jaremba, National Judges as EU Law Judges: The Polish Civil Law System 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2014); Urszula Jaremba, ‘At the Crossroads of National and 
European Union Law. Experiences of National Judges in a Multi-Level Legal Order’ (2013) 
6 Erasmus Law Review 191; Arthur Dyevre, ‘Unifying the Field of Comparative Judicial Pol-
itics: Towards a General Theory of Judicial Behaviour’ (2010) 2 European Political Science 
Review 297; Pavone (n 9).
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politics literature still lacks a general and unifying theory of what drives 
judicial behaviour in the process of European integration. Some scholars 
studying European courts integrate insights and evidence from Amer-
ican Legal Realism and American judicial politics literature into their 
work.16 Yet, an overarching theory to take into consideration judicial 
policy preferences,17 the institutional context in which judges operate,18 
and the trade-offs judges face19 when deciding whether or not to turn to 
the CJEU with a preliminary question is still missing. Although some 
scholars have advocated the idea of bringing European and American 
judicial politics together,20 empirical research efforts continue to focus 
on country- or court-level data, not taking into account the preferences 
and personal attributes of individual judges.21
The present paper contributes to European judicial politics by plac-
ing the study of judicial behaviour in the preliminary ruling procedure 
on more rigorous theoretical grounds. It incorporates insights and evi-
dence from American judicial politics literature and draws from three 
models of judicial decision making: the attitudinal model, the team mod-
el, and the resource management model. By doing so, it offers a system-
atic account of what drives judicial behaviour in the preliminary ruling 
procedure. The paper further enriches the research efforts that look be-
yond the number of referrals to the CJEU and that emphasise the role 
of individual profi les of judges on the application and enforcement of EU 
16 See the work of the following scholars: Arthur Dyevre, ‘Unifying the Field of Compara-
tive Judicial Politics: Towards a General Theory of Judicial Behaviour’ (2010) 2 European 
Political Science Review 297; Dyevre, Glavina and Atanasova (n 7); Nicolas Lampach and 
Arthur Dyevre, ‘Choosing for Europe: Judicial Incentives and Legal Integration in the Eu-
ropean Union’ [2019] European Journal of Law and Economics; Arthur Dyevre and Nicolas 
Lampach, ‘The Origins of Regional Integration: Untangling the Effect of Trade on Judicial 
Cooperation’ (2018) 56 International Review of Law and Economics 122; Pavone (n 9); Fran-
cisco Ramos Romeu, ‘Law and Politics in the Application of EC Law: Spanish Courts and 
the ECJ 1986-2000’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 395; Francisco Ramos Romeu, 
‘Judicial Cooperation in the European Courts: Testing Three Models of Judicial Behavior’ 
(2002) 2 Global Jurist Frontiers 1; Bruno de Witte and others (eds), National Courts and EU 
Law: New Issues, Theories and Methods (Edward Elgar Publishing 2016).
17 Jeffrey Allan Segal and Harold J Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model 
(CUP 1993); Jeffrey A Segal and Harold J Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal 
Model Revisited (New York: CUP 2002).
18 David W Rohde, ‘Policy Goals, Strategic, Choice and Majority Opinion Assignments in 
the U. S. Supreme Court’ (1972) 16 Midwest Journal of Political Science 652; Thomas H 
Hammond, Chris W Bonneau and Reginald S Sheehan, Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice 
on the U.S. Supreme Court (Stanford University Press 2005); Lee Epstein, William M Landes 
and Richard A Posner, The Behavior of Federal Judges (Harvard University Press 2013).
19 Lee Epstein and Jack Knight, ‘Reconsidering Judicial Preferences’ (2013) 16 Annual Re-
view of Political Science 11.
20 Dyevre (n 15).
21 Lampach and Dyevre (n 16); Dyevre, Glavina and Atanasova (n 7).
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law.22 The units of my analysis are individual national judges (level one), 
judges who are nested in a domestic court (level two), and courts that are 
ultimately nested in an EU Member State (level three). I further contrib-
ute to the empirical study of the European legal order by extending the 
research on two new EU Member States − Slovenia and Croatia − to see 
how the factors put forth by European judicial politics literature travel to 
these two countries.
The paper is structured as follows. Section Two discusses the de-
bates on the referral behaviour of national judges. Section Three gives its 
own account of the participation of national judiciaries in the preliminary 
ruling procedure and derives research hypotheses. I present three mod-
els of judicial decision making: the attitudinal model, the team model, 
and the resource management model that are believed to be complement-
ing rather than competing accounts of judicial behaviour. Section Four 
describes the choice of countries, data and methodology. Finally, Section 
Five presents and discusses the results of the statistical analysis.
2 Judicial cooperation and judicial behaviour
The fi eld of judicial behaviour has gone through notable theoreti-
cal advancements. Scholars of judicial politics have moved beyond the 
fruitless two-sided debate between the legalist and the attitudinal model, 
towards a more realistic notion of judicial behaviour. It is now widely rec-
ognised that the way in which judges decide cases is shaped by a broader 
set of factors: from their personal motivations, through their audience, to 
their preferences for leisure.23 A study of judicial behaviour and judicial 
decision making remained relatively unknown in Europe until the late 
20th century. Because it was believed that courts and judges are outside 
politics, European political scientists have rather focused on studying 
legislative and executive bodies.24 It is, thus, not surprising that the fi rst 
scholars to study European courts, including the CJEU, were American 
political scientists. Although they rarely employed the models of judicial 
22 Nowak and others (n 10); Jaremba, ‘At the Crossroads of National and European Union 
Law. Experiences of National Judges in a Multi-Level Legal Order’ (n 15); Mayoral Díaz-Asen-
sio, ‘In the CJEU Judges Trust: A New Approach in the Judicial Construction of Europe’ (n 
15); Mayoral, Jaremba and Nowak (n 15); European Parliament, ‘Report on the Role of the 
National Judge in the European Judicial System’ (2008) (2007/2027(INI)); Adam Lazowski, 
‘Half Full and Half Empty Glass: The Application of EU Law in Poland (2004−2010)’ (2011) 
48 Common Market Law Review 503; Pavone (n 9).
23 Richard A Posner, How Judges Think (Harvard University Press 2008); Epstein and 
Knight (n 20); Epstein, Landes and Posner (n 18); Elliott Ash and W Bentley MacLeod, 
‘Intrinsic Motivation in Public Service: Theory and Evidence from State Supreme Courts’ 
(National Bureau of Economic Research 2014) Working Paper 20664.
24 Dyevre (n 15) 298.
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behaviour originally developed in the American context, these scholars 
did advocate the view that the referral behaviour of national judges in 
the EU is shaped not only by the existence of legal rules, but by a broad-
er set of factors, from macro- (years of membership, population, intra 
EU-trade), meso- (court caseload, litigation levels, the power of judicial 
review), and micro-level determinants (individual preferences).25  
Starting from the macro-level determinants of judicial behaviour, 
scholars have sought to explain variations in the referral rates by point-
ing to disparities in intra-EU trade;26 legal culture;27 the type of dem-
ocratic tradition;28 Member State’s litigation rates;29 the country’s size 
and population levels;30 or public support for EU membership.31 Others 
have pointed out the existence of institutional disparities among different 
types and levels of courts and, thus, to the impact of meso-level factors on 
the referral behaviour of national judges. Scholars emphasise the desire 
for empowerment among lower courts;32 court specialisation;33 and judi-
cial centralisation.34 It has been argued that embracing the preliminary 
ruling procedure gives the national court more power, either vis-à-vis the 
25 Dyevre (n 15).
26 Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas L Brunell, ‘The European Court and the National Courts: A 
Statistical Analysis of Preliminary References, 1961−95’ (1998) 5 Journal of European Public 
Policy 66; Clifford J Carrubba and Lacey Murrah, ‘Legal Integration and Use of the Prelimi-
nary Ruling Process in the European Union’ (2005) 59 International Organization 399.
27 Carrubba and Murrah (n 26) 399; Maarten Vink, Monica Claes and Christine Arnold, 
‘Explaining the Use of Preliminary References by Domestic Courts in EU Member States: A 
Mixed-Method Comparative Analysis’, paper presented at the 11th Biennial Conference of 
the European Union Studies Association, Friday 24 April 2009.
28 Marlene Wind, Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen and Gabriel Pons Rotger, ‘The Uneven Legal 
Push for Europe Questioning Variation When National Courts Go to Europe’ (2009) 10 Eu-
ropean Union Politics 63; Marlene Wind, ‘The Nordics, the EU and the Reluctance Towards 
Supranational Judicial Review’ (2010) 48 JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 1039.
29 Lisa Conant, ‘Europeanization and the Courts: Variable Patterns of Adaptation among 
National Judiciaries’ in Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso and Thomas Risse (eds), 
Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change (Cornell University Press 
2001); Karen J Alter and Jeannette Vargas, ‘Explaining Variation in the Use of European 
Litigation Strategies: European Community Law and British Gender Equality Policy’ (2000) 
33 Comparative Political Studies 452; Vink, Claes and Arnold (n 27).
30 Sweet and Brunell (n 26); Vink, Claes and Arnold (n 27); Wind, Martinsen and Rotger (n 
28).
31 Carrubba and Murrah (n 27).
32 Weiler (n 4); Alter (n 4).
33 T de la Mare, ‘Article 177 in Social and Political Context’ in Paul Craig and Gráinne de 
Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP 1999); Morten Broberg and Niels Fenger, Prelim-
inary References to the European Court of Justice (OUP 2014).
34 Kelemen and Pavone (n 8); R Daniel Kelemen and Tommaso Pavone, ‘The Political Geog-
raphy of Legal Integration: Visualizing Institutional Change in the European Union’ (2018) 
70 World Politics 358.
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government35 or vis-à-vis other courts in the national judicial hierarchy.36 
Furthermore, courts with specialised jurisdiction were believed to be 
more frequent submitters simply because they encounter EU law more 
frequently in their daily caseload and have more opportunities to raise 
preliminary questions,37 although recent studies reject this argument.38 
Other scholars suggest that it is not about the type of cases judges 
decide on but also their number. Stone Sweet and Brunell, for instance, 
wrote that national judges have an incentive to dispose of their cases effi -
ciently and ‘go home at the end of the day having disposed of more, rath-
er than fewer, work-related problems’.39 In a similar vein, Dyevre posited 
that lower instance judges fi nd it more pressing to manage their huge 
caseload than being concerned about public support or the threat of leg-
islative override.40 Recent scholarly efforts offer empirical evidence on the 
role of workload on the application of EU law.41 Pavone42 and Glavina,43 
for example, found that workload pressures − which are most pressing 
among lower-court judges − are one of the main reasons for diffuse resis-
tance towards the CJEU and the preliminary ruling procedure.44 Schol-
ars have further considered the role of litigants in the process of Europe-
an legal integration and how they used national judges as a medium to 
gain access to the preliminary ruling mechanism.45 Conant stated that 
interest groups facilitate the pursuit of legal rights by providing informa-
tion and fi nancial support, which are both necessary to assist litigation 
before courts.46 Kelemen and Pavone then pointed to the existence of ‘hot 
spots’ for EU litigation, located near cargo ports where maritime trade 
activity is concentrated and in a city that hosts either a Supreme or a 
Constitutional Court.47
35 Weiler (n 4).
36 Alter (n 4).
37 de la Mare (n 33); Broberg and Fenger (n 33); Sweet and Brunell (n 26) 73.
38 Dyevre, Glavina and Atanasova (n 7).
39 Sweet and Brunell (n 26) 73.
40 Dyevre (n 15) 323.
41 Tobias Nowak and others, National Judges as European Union Judges: Knowledge, Expe-
riences and Attitudes of Lower Court Judges in Germany and the Netherlands (Eleven Inter-
national Publishing 2011); Jaremba, ‘National Judges as EU Law Judges’ (n 15); Pavone (n 
9); Glavina (n 2).
42 Pavone (n 9).
43 Glavina (n 2).
44 Pavone (n 9) 307; Glavina (n 2) 204.
45 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone Sweet and Joseph HH Weiler (eds), The European Court 
and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change in Its Social Context (Hart 
Publishing 1998) 222.
46 Conant (n 29) 98-99.
47 Kelemen and Pavone (n 34) 365-366.
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Finally, a recent stream of thoughts started emphasising the role 
of judges’ preferences and personal attributes in judicial behaviour and, 
related to it, the referral activity of national judges. This includes, inter 
alia, judges’ knowledge of EU law, their experiences when applying EU 
law in practice, and their attitudes towards the EU and EU law.48 Some 
of these research efforts reported on the gap between the formal obliga-
tions and expectations imposed on national judges on one hand, and the 
reality of judicial participation in the preliminary ruling procedure on 
the other.49 The European Parliament’s study on judicial training on EU 
law, for instance, highlighted the problems with making a referral to the 
CJEU that arise from insuffi cient knowledge of EU law or procedure.50 In 
a similar vein, Pavone reported that gaps in EU law knowledge − stem-
ming from the absence of judicial training in this fi eld − make judges un-
likely to raise preliminary questions on their own.51 A further approach 
to studying judicial knowledge was taken by Mayoral and others who fo-
cused on the role of generational differences, legal education and judges’ 
career paths on how judges assess their EU law knowledge.52 Finally, on 
the role of judicial attitudes, Dyevre and others discussed the possibili-
ty that judges − who are otherwise in favour of the procedure − may be 
discouraged from turning to the CJEU out of fear that this decision will 
attract an unfavourable response from the legislature. A judge who does 
not particularly care about European integration, by contrast, may want 
to request a preliminary ruling in order to change the legislative status 
quo in his country.53
48 European Parliament, ‘Judicial Training in the European Union Member States’ (2011); 
Nowak and others (n 10); Mayoral, Jaremba and Nowak (n 15); Vink, Claes and Arnold (n 
27); Lazowski (n 22); Allan F Tatham, ‘The Impact of Training and Language Competence on 
Judicial Application of EU Law in Hungary’ (2012) 18 European Law Journal 577; Mayoral 
Díaz-Asensio, ‘In the CJEU Judges Trust: A New Approach in the Judicial Construction of 
Europe’ (n 15); Lampach and Dyevre (n 16).
49 Nowak and others (n 10); U Jaremba and T Nowak, ‘The Role of EU Law Education and 
Training in the Functioning of National Courts as Decentralized EU Courts: An Empirical 
Investigation into the Polish and German Civil Judiciary’ [2012] Integration Through Legal 
Education: The Role of EU Legal Studies in Shaping the EU 111; Mayoral, Jaremba and 
Nowak (n 15); Mayoral Díaz-Asensio, ‘In the CJEU Judges Trust: A New Approach in the 
Judicial Construction of Europe’ (n 15); Pavone (n 9).
50 European Parliament (n 48) 26; John Coughlan, ‘Judicial Training in the EU: A Study for 
the European Parliament’ (2012) 13 ERA Forum 1, 4.
51 Pavone (n 9) 307. A similar observation was raised by Glavina. See Glavina (n 2) 201-202.
52 Mayoral, Jaremba and Nowak (n 15) 1131−1132.
53 Lampach and Dyevre (n 16) 8.
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3 Exploring the referral behaviour of national judges
To these theoretical debates, I add my own account of the referral 
behaviour of national judges. The fi rst building block of my theoretical 
framework incorporates insights from the attitudinal model. Analogous 
to scaling judges on a left-right or liberal-conservative dimension, I argue 
that EU Member States’ judges can be scaled on the pro- vs anti-EU in-
tegration dimension. To explain the application of the attitudinal model 
to the preliminary ruling procedure, I rely on the concept of case space.54 
In its most basic form, a case space is a line that represents all possible 
cases that a court might decide, together with a complete description of 
the facts of the case. Individual cases, as well as judges’ preferences over 
cases, can be placed somewhere on this one-dimensional line. Figure 2 
illustrates such a case space in a preliminary ruling procedure example. 
In two hypothetical referral cases, judges are confronted with a request 
to submit a preliminary question to the CJEU. Case A involves the ques-
tion of the interpretation of EU law where a ruling from the CJEU is not 
central for the case disposition, and the interpretation could be given by 
the national judge himself. Case B, in contrast, involves a question on 
the validity of EU law, in which a judge is obliged to make a referral and 
the CJEU’s ruling is central for delivering a judgment.
Figure 2. Case space in an example of a preliminary ruling procedure
Judge 1, who is pro-integration, will submit a preliminary question 
to the CJEU in every case that raises an issue of the interpretation or 
validity of EU law. Judge 2, who is not as pro-integration as Judge C, 
will only resort to the preliminary ruling mechanism if the question con-
cerns the validity of EU law and where the CJEU’s ruling is central for 
the case disposition. This may be a judge who is otherwise indifferent to 
EU law but wants to avoid negative criticism for not turning to the CJEU 
in cases when he is obliged to. Finally, Judge 3 is anti-integration and 
will avoid referring a legal question to the CJEU in any of the hypothet-
54 Glendon Schubert, The Judicial Mind: The Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court 
Justices 1946-1963 (Northwestern University Press 1965); Segal and Spaeth, The Supreme 
Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (n 17) 89−91.
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ical cases. This case space suggests that a judge on the pro-integration 
side of the dimension may want to make a referral to the CJEU even 
when the ruling of the CJEU is not central for delivering a judgment to 
promote deeper integration and to ensure uniform application and great-
er compliance with EU law.55 A judge on the anti-EU integration side, in 
contrast, will refuse to refer even in cases where he is obliged to do so56 
and when the CJEU’s ruling is central for case resolution, simply be-
cause he believes that a case should be resolved in light of national law. 
Based on this theoretical proposition, I derive the fi rst hypothesis (H1) of 
my research.
Understanding judicial attitudes is crucial for understanding judi-
cial behaviour in the preliminary ruling procedure. However, it must be 
emphasised that the desire to see one’s ideology imprinted in the law is 
not the only motivation for judges, and for many it might not even be 
the dominant one.57 Instead, judges have multiple interests and needs 
that they pursue simultaneously.58 Furthermore, in the process of deci-
sion making, judges are ultimately bound by the facts of the case and 
the legal arguments presented by the parties and are constrained by 
institutional rules.59 The ability of judges to decide cases in line with 
their ideological preferences, therefore, depends on various incentives 
and constraints for such behaviour. In other words, ideology is likely to 
play a larger role when other constraints are missing.
This brings me to the second building block of the theory, which 
follows the rationale of the ‘pure team model’.60 The team model is of-
ten seen as the opposite of the principal-agent (or ‘the agency’) model. 
It presupposes that judges share a common goal, which is to maximise 
the number of ‘correct’ decision outcomes given the limited resources 
they have at their disposal.61 The agency model, by contrast, points to 
confl icting interests among the judges. It assumes that judges have ideo-
logically opposed preferences and seek to implement those preferences 
through their decisions.62 Hierarchy exists ‘so that the small set of po-
55 Lampach and Dyevre (n 16) 8.
56 Either because he sits at the last instance court or when the question concerns the va-
lidity of EU law.
57 Epstein and Knight (n 19) 12−13.
58 Epstein, Landes and Posner (n 18) 48.
59 Wind (n 28).
60 Lewis A Kornhauser, ‘Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy and 
Precedent in a Judicial System Symposium on Positive Political Theory and Law’ (1994) 68 
Southern California Law Review 1605; Romeu (n 16).
61 Kornhauser (n 60) 1609. According to Kornhauser, ‘correctness’ may be interpreted in 
many ways. See ibid 1606, 1603.
62 Kornhauser (n 60) 1609.
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litically dominant judges can enforce their views on recalcitrant judges 
lower in the hierarchy’.63 The idea of an error is very different in the 
agency model compared to the team model. In the team model, an error 
arises from imperfect information about the case. In the agency model, 
by contrast, errors are deliberate and ‘rebellious’ decisions of lower-court 
judges to apply their rule instead of the preferred rule of a higher court.64 
While national hierarchical judiciaries are typically designed by a hy-
brid team/agency model (where inter-court cooperation is sustained by 
a threat of reversal and a division of tasks),65 heterarchical regimes such 
as that of the EU follow the design of the team model.66 
According to the team model, a national judge sends the prelimi-
nary question to Luxembourg simply because the CJEU is a specialised 
EU law court, and resolving a dispute at the national level will benefi t 
from the CJEU’s ruling.67 The rationale behind the judicial hierarchy 
is to achieve a division of labour and to minimise possible errors. The 
purpose of lower courts is fact-fi nding and the quick resolution of cases. 
The law-fi nding task is left for the appellate instance, with major doctri-
nal issues to be dealt with by supreme and constitutional courts. Fur-
thermore, appellate courts enjoy a lower workload and better access to 
resources, which allows them to spot and correct possible errors.68 In a 
nutshell, the law-fi nding specialisation, more benefi cial resources vs the 
workload ratio, and the fact that preliminary questions can only address 
points of law should give second instance domestic courts a greater in-
centive to refer legal questions to Luxembourg (H2). 
The third building block of the theory follows the rationale of the 
resource management model. National judges are public sector workers 
who have varying resources to process different workloads.69 Because 
there are only 24 hours in a day and only seven days a week, the central 
problem for judges is to strike a balance between judicial work, non-judi-
cial work and leisure.70 Having diffi culties in fi nding this balance, judges 
63 Lewis A Kornhauser, ‘Appeal and Supreme Courts’ in Boudewijn Bouckaert and Gerrit de 
Geest (eds), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (Edward Elgar 2000) 46.
64 Jonathan P Kastellec, ‘The Judicial Hierarchy: A Review Essay’ [2016] Oxford Research 
Encyclopedia of Politics 8; Charles M Cameron and Lewis A Kornhauser, ‘Appeals Mecha-
nism, Litigant Selection, and the Structure of Judicial Hierarchies’ in James R Rogers, Roy 
B Flemming and Jon R Bond (eds), Institutional Games and the US Supreme Court (Univer-
sity of Virginia Press 2006) 177.
65 Kastellec (n 64).
66 Kornhauser (n 60); Cameron and Kornhauser (n 64).
67 Romeu (n 16) 397.
68 Kornhauser (n 60) 1614; Kastellec (n 64) 6.
69 Epstein, Landes and Posner (n 18) 25.
70 Ash and MacLeod (n 23) 8.
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are faced with certain trade-offs, which may have a direct bearing on 
the decision to refer a legal question to the CJEU. Time, intellectual ef-
fort and resources spent on drafting and preparing a preliminary ques-
tion are time, effort and resources that cannot be spent on something 
else such as leisure, undergoing education, or managing one’s workload. 
Based on the resource management model, I hypothesise that the higher 
the workload of a particular judge, the higher are the opportunity costs 
associated with making a referral. We would, therefore, expect heavi-
ly burdened judges to be more reluctant to refer legal questions to the 
CJEU (H3). 
The opportunity costs of making a referral can, however, be lowered 
if a judge has suffi cient access to resources, such as access to state-of-
the-art libraries, databases and to law clerks and other assistants to 
the court. Yet not all judges have access to these resources. The better 
access to online databases and to the case law of the CJEU, the lower are 
the opportunity costs of making a referral. Furthermore, an important 
resource available to judges is the existence of an EU law research unit 
at the respective court. The existence of such a unit saves the time and 
effort a judge has to invest in doing research on the issue. We would, 
therefore, expect judges with suffi cient access to the sources of EU law 
and judges who benefi t from the assistance of a special EU law research 
unit to exhibit a higher propensity to refer legal questions to the Luxem-
bourg Court (H4).
Yet, if sending a question to Luxembourg only adds to judges’ sub-
stantial workload, it is diffi cult to imagine why any judge would opt for 
such a choice. This problem stresses the role of the individual profi les of 
judges. Judges differ from each other with regard to their competences, 
level of expertise, experiences with EU law, and how much time they 
have invested in EU law education. The higher the knowledge of EU 
law and the more experiences a judge has had with EU law, the lower 
is the opportunity cost of making a referral. This is because a judge 
with suffi cient knowledge of the preliminary ruling procedure or a judge 
who often encounters cases with an EU law element generally needs to 
invest less time and effort into drafting a reference than a judge who 
encounters it for the fi rst time and who has limited knowledge of it. More 
experience with EU law and better knowledge of the preliminary ruling 
procedure should, in principle, bring a higher probability of making a 
referral (H5 and H6). The summary of all research hypotheses is present-
ed in Table 1.
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Table 1. Summary of research hypotheses
H1 Attitudes Judicial attitudes towards the EU and EU law will affect 
the probability of making a referral.
H2 Court level Appellate court judges will exhibit a higher probability 
of making a referral.
H3 Workload Judges with a higher workload will exhibit a lower 
probability of making a referral.
H4 Resources Judges with suffi cient access to resources will exhibit a 
lower probability of making a referral
H5 Knowledge Judges with higher knowledge of EU law will exhibit a 
lower probability of making a referral
H6 Experience Judges with more experience with EU law cases will 
exhibit a lower probability of making a referral
4 Choice of countries, data and methodology
This paper relies on the data of a survey conducted among national 
judges in Slovenia and Croatia. The survey on the knowledge of, experi-
ences with, and attitudes towards EU law among national judges was con-
ducted among all fi rst and second instance courts in Slovenia and Croatia 
in spring 2017. It covered a population of 1,792 judges from 39 ordinary 
and 37 specialised courts in Croatia and 857 judges from 59 ordinary and 
six specialised courts in Slovenia. The response rate was 16.6 per cent 
for Croatia and 14.7 per cent for Slovenia (see Appendix, Table 1A).71 The 
questionnaire was borrowed from the research of Nowak and others con-
ducted in 2011.72 The percentage of missing survey data varies between 
one and ten per cent, depending on the question (see Appendix, Table 2A). 
The decision to focus on Croatia and Slovenia was made for method-
ological reasons. First, when taken in absolute numbers, Slovenian and 
Croatian courts have submitted the lowest number of preliminary ques-
tions compared to all post-2004 enlargement Member States, with the 
exception of Malta and Cyprus (see Appendix, Table 4A). When account-
ing for population, however, the number does not seem so low, at least for 
71 Although this may seem a low response rate, it is higher than the response rate obtained 
by Nowak and others on German judges (10 per cent) and by Jaremba obtained on Polish 
judges (8 per cent) (Nowak and others 2011; Jaremba 2014). Regarding the sample size, 
Roscoe and Abranovic argue that in behavioural research there is hardly any justifi cation 
for sample sizes smaller than 30 and larger than 500 participants. Within this limit, a sam-
ple size of 10 per cent of the population is recommended. Some researchers even suggest 
that it is rarely necessary to sample more than 10 per cent. See: John T Roscoe, Funda-
mental Research Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences (2nd edn, Holt, Rinehart and Winston 
1975); Wynn Anthony Abranovic, Statistical Thinking and Data Analysis Methods for Man-
agers (Addison-Wesley 1997); Pamela L Alreck and Robert B Settle, The Survey Research 
Handbook (2nd edn, Irwin Professional Publishing 1995).
72 Nowak and others (n 10).
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Slovenia. Croatia, by contrast, holds the lowest number of referrals per 
million inhabitants compared to all post-2004 enlargement states, includ-
ing Malta and Cyprus. These numbers, however, need to be seen in the 
light of the short membership of Croatia in the EU. When it comes to the 
number of judges per capita, however, Slovenia and Croatia do stand out. 
The two countries have the highest number of judges per capita in the en-
tire EU: Slovenia 42.6 and Croatia 43.3, while the EU average is only 21.2 
judges per 100,000 inhabitants. 73 Yet, as I illustrate in Table 4A in the 
Appendix, Croatia and Slovenia have the lowest number of referrals per 
number of judges and are in the same groups as Malta and Cyprus, the 
two smallest EU Member States. The argument that some Member States 
will refer more simply because they have more courts and judges that can 
refer questions does not seem to hold for Slovenia and Croatia. 74
Furthermore, although the main objective of this research is not to 
conduct a country-level comparison, the most similar system design (here-
after ‘MSSD’) allows us to control and to keep constant many confounding 
variables.75 Slovenia and Croatia are similar in the sense that they are 
both new EU Member States, they were both part of former Yugoslavia, and 
have shared a legal and judicial system in the past. Furthermore, there are 
no major discrepancies in the size of their population or GDP. They do, 
however, differ in the duration of their EU membership which could cause 
a difference in the factors that infl uence the referral propensity of national 
judges.76 This is particularly true when it comes to judicial knowledge of 
EU law and their experience with EU law cases in their daily work.
Slovenian and Croatian judges further differ in their use of the pre-
liminary ruling procedure. Croatian courts have submitted more prelim-
inary questions annually than have their Slovenian counterparts. Fur-
thermore, for the majority of EU Member States − with the exception of 
the early years of EU integration − it took one or two years to adapt to 
the mechanism and to send their fi rst preliminary question.77 Slovenia 
and Malta are the only two new EU Members States that took as many as 
four years before submitting their fi rst reference to the CJEU. Croatia, by 
contrast, followed the practice prevailing in other new Member States and 
submitted its fi rst reference in its second year of EU membership (see Fig-
ure 3). Furthermore, the majority of referrals from Slovenia originate from 
73 ‘EU Justice Scoreboard - European Commission’ (2016) 577.
74 Vink, Claes, and Arnold (n 27) 13.
75 Carsten Anckar, ‘On the Applicability of the Most Similar Systems Design and the Most 
Different Systems Design in Comparative Research’ (2008) 11 International Journal of So-
cial Research Methodology 389.
76 Lampach and Dyevre (n 16); Dyevre and Lampach (n 16); Romeu (n 16).
77 Court of Justice of the European Union, ‘The Annual Report of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union’ (2017).
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the third instance (the Supreme or the Constitutional Court) and none 
was submitted by a fi rst instance court. In Croatia, by contrast, ten refer-
ences were submitted to the CJEU by fi rst instance courts, one by an ap-
peal court, and none came from the Supreme or the Constitutional Court. 
Finally, research efforts on the Central and Eastern European Member 
States (‘CEE Member States’) have largely focused on the application of EU 
law and courts in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary,78 
leaving other post-2004 enlargement countries largely under-researched.
Figure 3. Trends in sending preliminary questions: Selected countries
78 Jaremba, ‘National Judges as EU Law Judges’ (n 15); Jaremba, ‘At the Crossroads of Na-
tional and European Union Law. Experiences of National Judges in a Multi-Level Legal Or-
der’ (n 15); Michal Bobek, ‘Landtová, Holubec, and the Problem of an Uncooperative Court: 
Implications for the Preliminary Rulings Procedure’ (2014) 10 European Constitutional 
Law Review 54; Michal Bobek (ed), Central European Judges Under the European Infl u-
ence: The Transformative Power of the EU Revisited (Bloomsbury Publishing 2015); Marcin 
Matczak, Mátyás Bencze and Zdeněk Kühn, ‘Constitutions, EU Law and Judicial Strategies 
in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland’ (2010) 30 Journal of Public Policy 81; Marcin 
Matczak, Mátyás Bencze and Zdeněk Kühn, ‘EU Law and Central European Judges: Admin-
istrative Judiciaries in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland Ten Years after Accession’ 
in Michal Bobek (ed), Central European Judges Under the European Infl uence: The Trans-
formative Power of the EU Revisited (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015); Jan Komárek, ‘National 
Constitutional Courts in the European Constitutional Democracy’ (2014) 12 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 525; Jan Komárek, ‘Czech Constitutional Court Playing with 
Matches: The Czech Constitutional Court Declares a Judgment of the Court of Justice of the 
EU Ultra Vires; Judgment of 31 January 2012, Pl. ÚS 5/12, Slovak Pensions XVII’ (2012) 8 
European Constitutional Law Review 323; David KosaÊ, ‘Politics of Judicial Independence 
and Judicial Accountability in Czechia: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law between Court 
Presidents and the Ministry of Justice’ (2017) 13 European Constitutional Law Review 96.
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The survey data that I introduced above was used to empirically test 
the determinants of referral behaviour that I presented in the theoreti-
cal section. The dependent variable used in this paper is the probability 
of sending a preliminary question to the CJEU in the case of interpreta-
tive doubts. Because Slovenian and Croatian judges have not been very 
active consumers of the preliminary ruling procedure, we cannot rely 
on the number of preliminary questions submitted to the CJEU as an 
appropriate measure of their referral behaviour. Instead, I rely on the 
reported willingness of national judges to submit a preliminary question 
to the CJEU in cases where they are expected to do so. The measure of 
the referral probability used in this research is, therefore, different from 
the actual number of preliminary questions that have been submitted by 
Slovenian and Croatian judges. The independent variables are the fol-
lowing: (1) attitudes towards the EU and EU law; (2) the judge’s individu-
al workload; (3) the court’s resources; (4) the court’s level; (5) knowledge 
of EU law; (6) experience with EU law. Several other control variables, de-
riving from previous research efforts, were added to the analysis. These 
are: (1) the type of court; (2) attitudes towards the EU and EU law; (3) 
parties’ input; (4) the judge’s seniority; and (5) the court’s location. The 
list of the variables and the survey questions used to measure them are 
presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. List of variables
Variable 
name





of making a 
referral
Discrete What is the probability that you 
would send a preliminary question 






Continuous As an estimate, how many cases 
did you decide in the past twelve 
months?
Experience Continuous As an estimate, in how many of the 
cases you decided in the past twelve 
months did European Union law 
play a role?
Court level Discrete At which court do you adjudicate 
(fi rst or second instance)?
Court type Discrete At which court do you adjudicate 
(generalised or specialised)?
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Variable 
name
Type of data Survey question
Explanatory 
variables
Attitudes Discrete I see myself as a European Union 
law judge, measured on the Likert 
scale. Trust in national institutions, 
namely the national parliament, the 
constitutional court, the supreme 
court, and the ministry of justice (0 
no trust − 10 complete trust). Trust 
in EU institutions, namely the Eu-
ropean Parliament, the European 
Commission, the Council of the EU, 





Discrete Index created on the basis of sever-
al questions measured on the Likert 
scale: (1) I know in which situations 
I am expected to refer a preliminary 
question to the CJEU; (2) I know 
how to ask a preliminary question to 
the CJEU; (3) The preliminary ruling 
procedure is clear to me; (4) I know 
how I am supposed to proceed with 
an answer of the CJEU to a prelimi-
nary question
Access Discrete How do you rate your access to 
sources of EU law (from very bad to 
very good)?
EU law unit Discrete Is there an advisor on EU law or an 
EU law research unit at the court 
where you sit? (yes or no)
Party input Discrete In practice, it is diffi cult to recognise 
if EU law is applicable to a case if the 
parties do not point this out, mea-
sured on the Likert scale.
Seniority Continuous For how many years have you 
worked as a judge?
Location Discrete At which court do you adjudicate? 
(in capital or not)
The dependent variable is considered ordinal with four levels interpreted 
as (1) very low, (2) low, (3) high, and (4) very high. An ordinal logistic re-
gression model can be formulated as follows:=  
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where j=1,…,J-1 is the level of the ordered response variable with J levels. 
In this case, J=4 since the dependent variable has four levels. There are 
different intercepts, α
j
, depending on the level of interest. The regres-
sion coeffi cients for the independent variables are denoted by vector β. 
In order to account for correlation between respondents within the two 
countries, standard errors are clustered by country. The bootstrap meth-
od was used for estimating standard errors with 1000 replications. The 
dataset used in this paper contains several missing values due to sur-
vey non-response. To account for the missing data, two different models 
were fi tted: fi rst, a model using complete case analysis (‘CC’) in which 
cases with missing values were deleted and the analysis was done on 
the complete observations only; as an alternative to this approach, I use 
an imputation method based on the machine learning algorithm Ran-
dom Forest, which is implemented in the ‘RandomForest’ package in the 
programming language R. Random Forest operates in such a way that 
it creates a large number of relatively uncorrelated individual decision 
trees. Each tree gives its own prediction of a missing value. Based on the 
‘wisdom of crowds’ logic, Random Forest chooses the prediction with the 
most votes as the model’s predicted value.79
5 Results 
To explore the determinants of the referral behaviour of national 
judges, I start with the regression tree. Regression trees are an effective 
tool to model complex relationships and to explore non-linear relation-
ships between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables.80 
The regression tree illustrated in Figure 4 suggests that judges’ knowl-
edge of the preliminary ruling procedure, their workload and attitudes 
towards the EU and EU law are the strongest predictors of the referral 
behaviour of national judges. The tree shows that judges who rate their 
knowledge of the procedure higher than 3.6 (on a 1 to 5 scale) report a 
higher probability of making a referral if there are interpretative doubts 
related to EU law. 
79 Fei Tang and Hemant Ishwaran, ‘Random Forest Missing Data Algorithms’ (2017) 10 
Statistical Analysis and Data Mining: The ASA Data Science Journal 363; Daniel J Stek-
hoven, MissForest: Nonparametric Missing Value Imputation Using Random Forest (2013), 
CRAN Repository <https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/missForest/missForest.pdf> 
accessed 1 August 2019. 
80 Hal R Varian, ‘Big Data: New Tricks for Econometrics’ (2014) 28 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 3; Glenn De’ath and Katharina E Fabricius, ‘Classifi cation and Regression 
Trees: A Powerful Yet Simple Technique for Ecological Data Analysis’ (2000) 81 Ecology 
3178; Lampach and Dyevre (n 16).
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Figure 4. Regression tree
Regression tree done on complete cases. The number of observations: 145.
The workload appears several times in the regression tree, but with 
an opposite sign. Judges whose workload exceeds a threshold of 450 cas-
es per year have the lowest probability of making a referral to the CJEU. 
Yet, as the regression tree suggests, the relationship between judicial 
workload and the referral behaviour of national judges is not linear but 
rather follows the form of a quadratic equation. I interpret this result as 
follows. A judge with fewer cases on his docket (fewer than 130 cases, 
as suggested by the regression tree) has fewer opportunities to encoun-
ter EU law. Because of his scarce experience with EU law, he will be 
less likely to know how to handle such a case once it shows up on his 
docket. The probability of making a referral to the CJEU thus rises with 
an increasing workload but only to a certain point. Once the number of 
cases on a judge’s docket becomes more pressing, this probability will 
decrease.
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Table 3. Ordinal logistic regression model for referral behaviour
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Number of observations 145 182 145 182
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
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I now turn to the results of ordinal regression analysis, whose esti-
mates are presented in Table 3. The analysis was done on four different 
models. Model 1 relies on complete cases, that is, cases with no missing 
values, and it includes 145 observations. As for the second model, miss-
ing values were predicted with a Random Forest imputation technique. 
Furthermore, because the regression tree illustrated in Figure 4 shows 
a non-linear quadratic relationship between the individual workload of a 
judge and the probability of referral, two additional models with a vari-
able (workload)2 were fi tted. The effect of individual variables is presented 
in Table 5A in the Appendix.
I start with the interpretation of individual-level factors. Based on the 
results of the ordinal logistic regression presented in Table 3, I accept Hy-
pothesis 1 of my research. As can be seen from the table, based on Model 
1 and at the 0.001 level of signifi cance, the more judges see themselves as 
EU law judges, the more likely they are to opt for a preliminary question 
in the case of interpretative doubts. The odds of moving from a ‘(very) 
low’ to ‘(very) high’ probability of sending a preliminary reference to the 
CJEU are multiplied by exp(0.4126)=1.51 for every one-unit increase in 
the variable ‘I see myself as an EU judge’. This variable is signifi cant in all 
four models. A similar pattern holds for judges’ trust in EU institutions. 
Although only signifi cant in Model 2 and Model 4, the more a judge trusts 
EU institutions (which include the CJEU, the European Parliament, the 
European Commission, and the Council of the EU), the more likely they 
are to make a referral to the CJEU in the case of interpretative doubts. 
Based on Model 2, the odds of moving from a ‘(very) low’ to a ‘(very) high’ 
probability of making a referral are multiplied by exp(0.024)=1.02 for ev-
ery one-unit increase in the variable ‘Trust in EU institutions’. These 
results confi rm that the attitudinal model of judicial decision making 
can be fruitfully applied to the study of what drives judicial participation 
in the preliminary ruling procedure. I demonstrate that judges who are 
closer to the pro-integration side of the dimension will be more eager to 
turn to the CJEU in the case of interpretative doubts with EU law. Judges 
closer to the anti-integration of the dimension, by contrast, will prefer to 
solve a case without getting the Luxembourg Court involved.
I further accept Hypothesis 5 of my research. Knowledge of EU law 
has been found positive and statistically signifi cant at the 0.001 sig-
nifi cance level in all models used in this research. Based on the fi rst 
model, the odds of moving from a ‘(very) low’ to a ‘(very) high’ probabil-
ity of sending a preliminary reference to the CJEU are multiplied by 
exp(1.0829)=2.95 for every unit increase in ‘knowledge of the preliminary 
ruling procedure’. This result is in line with the resource management 
model according to which knowledge of the preliminary ruling procedure 
lowers the opportunity cost of making a referral simply because a judge 
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with suffi cient knowledge of the procedure has to invest less time and 
less effort into drafting a reference. This result challenges the argument 
that more expertise in EU law will make national judges more eager to 
take the interpretation of EU law in their own hands rather than turning 
to the CJEU for help.81 
Finally, the results show a statistically signifi cant and positive effect 
of experience with EU law on the probability of making a referral in three 
out of four models used in this research. Based on Model 1, the odds of 
moving from a ‘(very) low’ to a ‘(very) high’ probability of sending a prelim-
inary reference to the CJEU are multiplied by exp(1.01006)=1.01 for every 
unit increase in ‘experience with EU law’. Thus, the more cases with an 
EU law element that judges have solved in one calendar year, the keener 
they will be to use the preliminary ruling procedure in practice.  Experi-
ence with EU law cases is an important factor to explore as only four out of 
415 judges covered by the survey submitted a preliminary question to the 
CJEU. This factor, therefore, does not capture judges’ previous experience 
with the preliminary ruling procedure, but rather with EU law in general, 
which is an important precondition for recognising situations that require 
making a referral to the CJEU in the case of interpretative doubts. 
I now turn to the role of court-level factors in the referral behaviour 
of national judges. This paper fi nds a statistically signifi cant and posi-
tive effect of the appellate court level on the probability of submitting a 
legal question to the CJEU. Such an effect was found in all four models 
used in this research. Based on the fi rst model, the odds of having a 
‘(very) high’ probability of sending a preliminary question to the CJEU 
are 56 per cent (1-exp(-0.8221)=0.44) lower among fi rst instance judg-
es as compared to second instance judges. I interpret these results as 
evidence that the law-fi nding specialisation, as well as a more benefi -
cial resource vs workload ratio, gives appellate national courts more in-
centive to turn to the CJEU with a preliminary question. Furthermore, 
because preliminary questions can only address points of law, second 
instance judges have much more to gain from outsourcing the law-cre-
ation task to the CJEU.82 This result holds irrespective of the fact that 
many preliminary questions that came from Croatia were submitted by 
fi rst instance courts. Recent research efforts show that fi rst instance 
courts have pioneered the use of Article 267 TFEU proceedings. Yet, over 
time, these were overtaken by appellate and supreme and constitutional 
courts, which now dominate the preliminary ruling procedure (see Fig-
ure 5).83 This trend holds for the majority of EU Member States and it is 
81 Romeu (n 16) 397; Vink, Claes and Arnold (n 27) 8.
82 Romeu (n 16); Dyevre, Glavina and Atanasova (n 7).
83 Dyevre, Glavina and Atanasova (n 7).
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only a matter of time before it becomes evident in Croatia. Furthermore, 
that fi rst instance judges see appellate and supreme and constitutional 
courts as ‘true enforcers of EU law’ has also been reported by Glavina. 
Based on the results of interviews with judges, she found that dealing 
with the preliminary ruling procedure is often not perceived as the pur-
pose of the fi rst instance. The interviewed judges admitted that EU law 
questions are often left to the higher instance, that is, to the appellate or 
the supreme court.84
Figure 5. Referral activity according to the level of the referring court, 1961-2017
The graph includes all preliminary questions submitted by courts in all 28 EU 
Member States between 1961 and 2017. Category ‘third instance’ covers supreme 
and constitutional courts. 
Source: EUTHORITY project data collection85
84 Glavina (n 2) 207.
85 See <https://euthority.eu/?page_id=795> accessed 11 May 2020; Dyevre, Glavina, and 
Atanasova (n 7).
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I further accept Hypothesis 3 and show that the workload increas-
es the opportunity costs of making a referral. The negative effect of the 
workload on the referral propensity of national judges was confi rmed in 
all four models used in the analysis, for both the linear and quadrat-
ic relationship between the variables. Based on the results of the fi rst 
model, the odds of moving from a ‘(very) low’ to a ‘(very) high’ probability 
of sending a preliminary reference to the CJEU are reduced by 0.01 (1-
exp(-0.00105)) for every unit increase in ‘judicial workload’.86 The role of 
workload on the referral propensity of Slovenian and Croatian judges is 
partly a result of the existence of the court’s targets that prescribe the 
number of cases a particular judge should solve in one calendar year87 or 
the time period in which a judgment should be delivered.88 Not fulfi lling 
this numerical target can result in a lower judicial grade at the end of 
the calendar year and can also lead to sanctions such as a lower salary 
or even dismissal.89 Furthermore, sending a preliminary question under 
the time targets requires writing a special report where judges have to 
justify why sending a preliminary question might take longer than pre-
scribed.90The existence of court targets and the possibility that the unre-
solved workload results in sanctions create a contra-incentive for judges 
to use the preliminary ruling procedure in their daily work. This sup-
ports the argument that in deciding cases judges are often constrained 
by different institutional rules or practices that exist at the national level 
and which make referral to the CJEU more time and effort consuming, 
similar to what was reported by Wind in the case of Denmark.91
Another meso-level factor that was found statistically signifi cant is 
the existence of a research unit on EU law. Based on Model 1, the odds 
of having a ‘(very) high’ probability of sending a preliminary question to 
CJEU are 53 per cent (1-(exp(-0.7471)=0.47) lower among judges without 
a unit on EU law in their court as opposed to those who benefi t from such 
assistance. I interpret this result as evidence that additional resourc-
es available to judges lower the opportunity costs of making a referral. 
86 Discussing the role of the workload requires taking into account the case complexity. 
Different courts deal with cases of different complexity. For example, fi rst instance courts 
typically process simpler cases than second instance courts. Yet, cases relating to commer-
cial law are more complex than civil and criminal law fi rst instance cases. To account for 
case complexity, I control for the court type.
87 Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Croatia, ‘Framework Criteria for Judicial Work (Ok-
virna mjerila za rad sudaca)’ 9.
88 Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Slovenia, ‘Time Standards: Expected Times for 
Performing Typical Process Actions and Court Cases (»asovni Standardi: PriËakovani »asi 
Opravljanja TipiËnih Procesnih Dejanj in Reševanja Zadev Na SodišËih)’.
89 Glavina (n 2).
90 ibid 205.
91 Wind (n 28) 1051.
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Judges who have access to a special research unit or a person who spe-
cialises in EU law will have to spend less time and effort on conducting 
research and on drafting a question. Time and resources that they save 
by outsourcing the production of EU law knowledge to a specialist can 
be used on something else, such as getting home early on a Friday night 
or managing their caseload.92 As for ‘access to sources of EU law and the 
CJEU’s jurisprudence’, the analysis does not show a statistically signifi -
cant effect of the access variable in any of the models used in this paper. 
The type of court, which was used as a control variable and a proxy 
for case complexity, was not found signifi cant in any of the models. The 
results on Slovenian and Croatian judges, thus, do not support the ar-
gument that judges working at specialised courts should be more fre-
quent participants of the procedure simply because they encounter EU 
law more frequently.93 This result, however, is in line with the fi ndings 
of Dyevre and others who fi nd no conclusive evidence that jurisdictional 
specialisation correlates with the higher referral propensity of national 
courts.94 Furthermore, a positive effect of litigants’ input on the referral 
behaviour of national judges was found to be statistically signifi cant at 
the signifi cance level of 0.5 in Model 3 and Model 4. Finally, the last two 
control variables, the court’s location and the judge’s seniority, were not 
found signifi cant in any of the four models. This fi nding suggests that 
the research conclusions of Mayoral and others on the judges’ age95 and 
those of Dyevre and Lampach on the court’s location96 do not travel to 
Slovenia and Croatia. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper contributes to European judicial politics literature by 
placing the study of the referral behaviour of national judges on more rig-
orous theoretical grounds. It combines insights and evidence from Amer-
ican judicial politics literature and argues that whether or not national 
judges turn to the CJEU by means of the preliminary ruling procedure 
depends on the interaction of various individual- and court-level fac-
tors. I derived hypotheses from three models of judicial decision making: 
92 Ash and MacLeod (n 23).
93 de la Mare (n 33); Broberg and Fenger (n 33).
94 Arthur Dyevre, Angelina Atanasova and Monika Glavina, ‘Who Asks Most? Institutional 
Incentives and Referral Activity in the European Union Legal Order’ (Social Science Re-
search Network 2017) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3051659.
95 Mayoral, Jaremba and Nowak (n 15).
96 Arthur Dyevre and Nicolas Lampach, ‘The Unequal Reach of Transnational Institutions: 
Mapping, Predicting and Explaining Spatial Disparities in the Use of EU Law’ (Social Sci-
ence Research Network 2018) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3136462 <https://papers.ssrn.
com/abstract=3136462> accessed 15 March 2018.
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the attitudinal model, the resource management model, and the team 
model. First, in line with the attitudinal model that scales judges on a 
pro- vs anti-EU integration dimension, I fi nd evidence that the referral 
behaviour of national judges is infl uenced by whether judges see them-
selves as Union judges and by the extent to which they trust EU institu-
tions. Attitudes, however, play a much more important role when other 
constraints are missing. One such constraint is the judicial workload. I 
demonstrate that the pressure to manage one’s workload might be more 
pressing than the desire to see one’s own preferences imprinted in law 
or the desire to raise one’s reputation. Furthermore, and consistent with 
the resources management model, my results show that judges closer to 
the pro-EU integration side of the spectrum are more likely to turn to 
the CJEU with a preliminary question if their annual workload does not 
exceed 450 cases. The opportunity costs of making a referral are, how-
ever, lower among judges with suffi cient experience and knowledge with 
respect to EU law and among those who enjoy support from a special EU 
law research unit at their court. Finally, in line with the team model of 
judicial decision making, I demonstrate that law-fi nding specialisation, a 
more favourable workload vs resources ratio, as well as the fact that pre-
liminary questions can only address points of law, give second instance 
courts more incentives to use the preliminary ruling procedure in their 
daily work. With these novel fi ndings, I demonstrate that the attitudi-
nal model, the team model, and the resource management model are 
complementary rather than competing accounts of judicial behaviour, 
adding an additional dimension to the grand theories of European le-
gal, political, economic and social integration that have developed in the 
course of the last two decades.
This research offers a valuable contribution to European judicial 
politics literature. Yet, it suffers from several methodological limitations. 
The focus on two EU Member States (Slovenia and Croatia) does not al-
low for testing the macro-level determinants of judicial behaviour such as 
the population, intra-EU trade, or public support for EU membership. It 
does, however, allow for exploring meso- and micro-level determinates of 
judicial behaviour much more rigorously and in more detail than study-
ing all 28 Member States ever would. The problem of the generalisation 
of research results to all EU Member States, nonetheless, remains. The 
results of this research are much more applicable to new EU Member 
States (that joined the EU in 2004 or later) than they are to the old Mem-
ber States. This is because some constraints in the application of EU 
law are more evident among new Member States’ judges than among old 
ones. Scholars have, for example, argued that because post-communist 
judges rely on textualism (that is, on a narrow and limited set of argu-
ments, the earlier case law of the same court, accepted and well-estab-
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lished legal doctrines, and on the traditional methods of interpretation) 
they are not able to apply EU law properly.97 Another factor to take into 
account is judicial knowledge of EU law. The old Member States and their 
judiciaries have had a considerably longer period to adapt to EU law doc-
trines as they  have emerged. The new Member States, by contrast, had 
to accept the entire acquis communautaire overnight. 
Because the survey that I rely on for the purpose of this paper has 
been employed before on Dutch, German,  Polish,  and Spanish judges, 
my suggestion for future research is to merge these data and to test 
whether the determinants of judicial behaviour, as uncovered by this re-
search, hold for the other studied Member States. Furthermore, a focus 
on six Member States, of which three are considered old Member States 
would allow some macro-level factors to be added to the analysis, allow-
ing for a better overview of what drives judicial behaviour in Article 267 
TFEU proceedings. I further hope this research will inspire other schol-
ars to use the survey on the knowledge of, experience with, and attitudes 
towards EU law on the remaining 22 EU Member States, and to bring 
new data and insights on the application and enforcement of EU law by 
national judges.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution − Non-Commercial 
− No Derivatives 4.0 International License.
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APPENDIX
Figure 1A.  Correlation matrix
Table 1A. Number of preliminary references in the CEE Member States












The table shows the number of referrals since a Member 
State’s accession to the EU until 2018.
Source: CJEU, Annual reports.









% of female 
participants 
Slovenia 65 857 126 14.7% 71%
Croatia 76 1,792 289 16.6% 74%
The response rate corresponds closely to the actual gender distribution in 
Slovenia and Croatia. The share of female judges at fi rst and second instance 
courts in 2016 was 70.8 per cent for Croatia and 75 per cent in Slovenia.
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Table 3A. The proportion of missing data
Variable Percentage
Dependent variable Referral propensity 3.57
Independent variables Individual workload
Experience with EU law
Knowledge of preliminary ruling 
procedure
Acknowledging the role of parties
Access to sources of EU law
Consultant/Research unit on EU law
I see myself as an EU judge















The table shows the proportion of missing data for the variables used for the 
analysis in this paper. 





















Cyprus 7 13 0.5 0.86 8.14 13.1 0.53
Estonia 28 13 2.1 1.31 21.37 17.6 1.59
Hungary 158 13 12.1 9.77 16.17 28.7 5.51
Latvia 60 13 4.6 1.93 31.09 25.5 2.35
Lithuania 55 13 4.2 2.80 19.64 27.3 2.01
Malta 3 13 0.2 0.47 6.38 10.2 0.29
Poland 127 13 9.7 37.97 3.34 26.0 4.88
Czech R. 57 13 4.3 10.61 5.37 28.4 2.01
Slovakia 44 13 3.4 5.44 8.09 24.1 1.83
Slovenia 20 13 1.5 2.06 9.71 42.6 0.47
Bulgaria 117 10 11.7 7.05 16.60 31.8 3.68
Romania 139 10 13.9 19.52 7.12 23.6 5.89
Croatia 11 5 2.2 4.10 2.68 43.3 0.25
Includes data for the year 2017. Data source: CJEU annual report; Eurostat; EU Scoreboard98 
98 Court of Justice of the European Union, ‘The Annual Report of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union’; European Commission, ‘Eurostat. National Accounts (Including GDP)’ 
2018; ‘EU Justice Scoreboard - European Commission’ <https://ec.europa.eu/info/poli-
cies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-justice-scoreboard> accessed 
25 May 2016.
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Figures 2A. Relationship between the probability of referral and independent 
variables
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